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Abstract
We study cooperative interval games. These are cooperative games where the
value of a coalition is given by a closed real interval specifying a lower bound
and an upper bound of the possible outcome. For interval cooperative games,
several (interval) solution concepts have been introduced in the literature. We
assume that each player has a different attitude towards uncertainty by means of
the so-called Hurwicz coefficients. These coefficients specify the degree of optimism
that each player has, so that an interval becomes a specific payoff. We show that
a classical cooperative game arises when applying the Hurwicz criterion to each
interval game. On the other hand, the same Hurwicz criterion can be also applied
to any interval solution of the interval cooperative game. Given this, we say that a
solution concept is Hurwicz compatible if the two procedures provide the same final
payoff allocation. When such compatibility is possible, we characterize the class of
compatible solutions, which reduces to the egalitarian solution when symmetry is
required. The Shapley value and the core solution cases are also discussed.
Keywords: Cooperative interval games, Hurwicz criterion, Hurwicz compati-
bility
∗Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Economı´a y Competitividad (ECO2014-52616-R),
Ministerio de Economı´a, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2017-82241-R), and Xunta de Galicia (GRC
2015/014) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni, Universita` di Napoli Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125
Naples, Italy.
‡Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Universidade de Vigo, 36200 Vigo (Pontevedra),
Spain.
1
1 Introduction
Given a set of agents (or players), cooperative (or transferable utility) games assign to each
coalition of agents a real number which represents the maximum utility that the members
of this coalition can assure by themselves. Cooperative game theory has addressed these
problems by proposing relevant solutions, or values, that suggest one or several payoff
allocations satisfying certain desirable properties. Typically, the most standard property
is efficiency, which implies that the worth of the grand coalition is shared. Some examples
of efficient solutions are the core, the Weber set, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus.
Cooperative interval games generalize the idea of cooperative games by assigning
to each coalition a closed interval. Analogously, efficient interval solutions propose an
allocation of the interval generated by the grand coalition. Many of the classical solutions
have been defined in the context of cooperative interval games by Alparslan-Gok et al.
(2008); Alparslan Go¨k et al. (2009c). See Branzei et al. (2010) for a survey.
Interval games have been applied to bankruptcy problems (Branzei and Alparslan Go¨k,
2008), airport games Alparslan Go¨k et al. (2009a), minimum cost spanning tree problems
(Montemanni, 2006; Moretti et al., 2011), assignment problems (Pereira and Averbakh,
2011; van den Brink et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2018), and sequencing games (Alparslan-Go¨k
et al., 2013).
A classical interpretation of the intervals is that each of them represents the possible
worth range that a coalition can get by themselves. Examples are those that appear from
the so-called games with externalities (Thrall and Lucas, 1963), where the worth of a
coalition depends not only on the coalition itself, but also on how the rest of the players
cooperate.1 van den Brink et al. (2017) propose a different motivation, where the worth
of a coalition varies between the (classical) pessimistic assumption that the rest of players
will try to harm them as much as possible, and the most optimistic assumption given by
the dual problem.
At this point, we have to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. In a risky situation,
players are unsure of the final result of their own cooperation, but they can assign a
precise probability to each possible outcome. This kind of riskiness has been deeply
studied in the economic literature, both from a cooperative and non-cooperative point
of view. Frequently, it is assumed that each player has some private information and
1 For example, assume that players form an oligopoly that plans to create a cartel. The cartel can then
anticipate their benefit as a monopoly. However, if two or more players are not present, the remaining
players can not anticipate their exact benefit, as it would depend on whether the other players merge or
not.
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a precise knowledge of the probability distribution of how the others are. Yet, this
approach does not fit into the model proposed by interval games, where each interval
does not depend on the private information of the players. In other situations, probability
distribution is common knowledge but their consequences are not homogeneous among
players (Alparslan-Go¨k et al., 2013). Again, this approach neither fits interval games,
where each interval is coalition-dependent.
As opposed, under uncertainty, players are not only unsure of the final outcome of their
potential cooperation, but also of the probability of these possible outcomes. When there
is no private information, i.e. all the players agree on the uncertainty that lies behind
the cooperation of each coalition, interval games provide a more realistic interpretation
of uncertainty.
An interval solution is then a way to share the uncertainty of the grand coalition
worth taking into account the uncertain worth of each coalition.
Given this, each player can have a different attitude towards uncertainty. For example,
a pessimistic player would prefer to maximize the minimum possible outcome (maximin
criterion), so that its preferred payoff is an interval with a high lower bound, whereas an
optimistic (maximax criterion) player would prefer intervals with a high upper bound.
An intermediate approach (Laplace criterion or criterion of rationality) is to assume
all the possible outcomes are equally probable, in the sense that they follow an uniform
distribution. Hence, players with a Laplace criterion prefer intervals with a high midpoint.
A generalization of these criteria is the so-called Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz, 1951),
which states that there exists a fixed coefficient between 0 and 1 that measures the degree
of optimism. Hence, a pessimistic player would have a coefficient 0, an optimistic one 1,
and a rational one (in the sense of Laplace) 1
2
.
Obviously, once the Hurwicz coefficients are stated for each player, uncertainty dis-
appears and players can uniquely assign a concrete value to each interval. The payoff
allocation of the grand coalition interval becomes a payoff allocation for the grand coali-
tion. We can then check the payoff allocation proposed by each interval solution.
In this paper, we study what happens when this statement of the coefficients is done
on the interval game, prior to applying any interval value. We prove (Proposition 3.1)
that this operation generates a (classical) cooperative game, so that we can compute its
interval value.2
2 Other applications of Hurwicz coefficients in interval games appear in Lardon (2017) and Li (2016),
who also deduce a (classical) cooperative game by using a selection via degrees of optimism. However,
these degrees are coalition-dependent, not individual. Hence, they cannot be identified as Hurwicz
coefficients in the same way we do here.
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Hence, we can proceed in two ways. On the one hand, we can compute the interval
value on the interval game, and then apply the Hurwicz criterion. On the other hand, we
can apply the Hurwicz criterion in the interval game in order to get a (classical) cooper-
ative game, then apply the interval solution.3 We are interested in studying which values
are compatible in the sense that both procedures provide the same final payoff allocation.
This property has the potential of solving situations where players have uncertain needs
for a resource when it has to be divided before uncertainty resolves (Xue, 2018).
Our second result (Proposition 3.2) implies that this property is incompatible with
efficiency in the more general setting. However, we focus on the only two situations
where they are compatible. On one hand, we can assume that all the players have the
same Hurwicz coefficient. On the other hand, we can assume that uncertainty disappears
when the grand coalition forms. The latter is what actually happens in the motivating
examples: both games with externalities and the optimistic-pessimistic approach given
by van den Brink et al. (2017).
We prove (Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 5.1) that the only compatible solutions are the
proportional ones. These are solutions that have recently received increasing attention
from the economic and social choice theory (Abe and Nakada, 2019; Be´al et al., 2016;
Koster and Boonen, 2019; Yokote et al., 2018). They state that the worth of the grand
coalition should be proportionally distributed. As a direct corollary, we deduce (Theorem
4.2 and Theorem 5.2) that the unique anonymous (in the sense that symmetric agents
are treated symmetrically) compatible solution is the egalitarian one. This states an
equivalence between Hurwicz compatibility and the egalitarian notion given by the Dutta
and Ray (1989) interpretation ideally yielding Lorenz-dominant allocations but without
core-like participation constrains. Egalitarian outcomes are also backed by experimental
evidence (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). It is worthy to note that usual characterizations
of the egalitarian solution heavily rely on the properties of either additivity (Be´al et al.,
2016, 2019; Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga, 2004; Casajus and Huettner, 2014a; Hougaard
and Moulin, 2018; van den Brink, 2007; van den Brink et al., 2015) or monotonicity
Casajus and Huettner (2013, 2014b), which are not required here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the notation.
In Section 3, we define the Hurwicz criterion and prove that it can only be applied in
two particular situations, which are analysed in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In
Section 6, we focus on the core. In Section 7, we present some concluding remarks.
3This is always possible to do, since interval cooperative games generalize classical ones.
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2 Notation
Let I :=
{
ia =
[
ia, ia
]
: ia, ia ∈ R, ia ≤ ia} be the set of closed intervals in R. Given
ia, ib ∈ I, we say that ia 4 ib when ia ≤ ib and ia ≤ ib. Notice that if ia = [a, a] and
ib = [b, b] for some a, b ∈ R, we have that ia 4 ib iff a ≤ b. Remark that 4 is a partial
order relation in I; for example [−1, 2] 4 [0, 2] but [−2, 3] and [−1, 2] are not comparable
with respect to 4.
Given x ∈ R+ and iy =
[
iy, iy
] ∈ I, we define x · iy := [x · iy, x · iy] ∈ I. Given
αj ∈ R and ia =
[
ia, ia
] ∈ I, we define
αj ◦ ia := αj · ia+ (1− αj) · ia = ia+ αj ·
(
ia− ia) ∈ R.
Given ia, ib ∈ I, we define ia⊕ib := [ia+ ib, ia+ ib] ∈ I, and iaib := [ia− ib, ia− ib] ∈
I; moreover, when ia − ib ≤ ia − ib, we define ia 	 ib := [ia− ib, ia− ib] ∈ I. When
iA = {ia1, . . . , iak} ⊂ I, we define∑
ia∈iA
ia := ia1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ iak ∈ I
with the convention that
∑
ia∈∅ ia := [0, 0].
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A coalitional interval game is a pair
(N, iv) where iv : 2N → I is a function that assigns a closed interval iv(S) = [iv(S), iv(S)]
to each coalition S ⊆ N with the property that iv(∅) = [0, 0], i.e. iv(∅) = iv(∅) = 0. Let
IGN denote the class of all coalitional interval games with N as set of players. Since N
is fixed, from now on we write iv instead of (N, iv) and IG instead of IGN .
Notice that coalitional interval games generalize classical coalitional (transferable util-
ity, or TU) games. Just take iv(S) = iv(S) for all S ⊆ N . There are three trivial TU
games associated to any iv ∈ IG. These are the border games iv and iv, and the length
game |iv| given by |iv|(S) = iv(S) − iv(S) for all S ⊆ N . Let G denote the set of TU
games with N as player set. With some abuse of notation, we assume G ⊂ IG.
Apart from coalitional interval games, another generalization of TU games are non-
transferable utility games, or NTU games. An NTU game V with player set N is given by
a characteristic function V : 2N → ⋃S⊆N RS, with the convention R∅ = {0}, satisfying,
for all S ⊆ N :
1. V (S) ⊆ RS
2. V (S) 6= ∅
3. V (S) closed
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4. V (S) bounded from above, i.e. ∃x ∈ RS such that V (S) ∩ {y ∈ RS : y ≥ x} = ∅
5. V (S) comprehensive, i.e. x ∈ V (S), y ≤ x =⇒ y ∈ V (S).
Any TU game v can be written as an NTU game V as follows:
V (S) =
{
x ∈ RS :
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S)
}
for all S ⊆ N .
Notice that we can write any interval game iv ∈ IG applying natural generalization
of NTU games as follows:
iV (S) =
{
ia ∈ IS :
∑
j∈S
iaj 4 iv(S)
}
(1)
for all S ⊆ N . We then say that iV is an interval game written in NTU form.
A relevant class of coalitional interval games is the following (Alparslan Go¨k et al.,
2009b). A coalitional interval game iv is size monotonic if |iv|(S) ≤ |iv|(T ) for all
S ⊆ T ⊆ N . We denote as SMIG the set of size monotonic interval game with N as
player set. Clearly, all TU games are size monotonic interval games, i.e. G ⊂ SMIG.
A solution in the set of TU games is a function σ : G → RN that assigns to each
coalitional TU game v ∈ G a payoff allocation σ(v) ∈ RN . A solution σ in the set of
coalitional games is efficient if
∑
j∈N σj(v) = v(N) for all v ∈ G. A well-known efficient
solution in the set of TU games is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
Let IB be a subset of IG such that it contains all the TU games, i.e. G ⊆ IB. An
efficient solution for IB is a function iσ : IB → IN that assigns to each iv ∈ IB a payoff
allocation iσ(iv) ∈ IN such that ∑j∈N iσj(iv) = iv(N) for all iv ∈ IB.
3 Hurwicz criterion
The most well-known criterion to deal with uncertainty was first stated by Hurwicz (1951).
Assume that each player j ∈ N has a coefficient αj ∈ [0, 1] which determines its degree
of optimism. This means that if player j faces an interval ia ∈ I, its individual valuation
of it will be αj ◦ ia.
Given α ∈ [0, 1]N and an interval game solution iσ : IB → IN , we define α ◦ iσ :
IB → RN as the function given by applying the Hurwicz criterion to iσ with coefficients
in α, i.e.
(α ◦ iσ)j(iv) := αj ◦ iσj(iv) ∈ R (2)
6
for all iv ∈ IB and all j ∈ N .
Analogously, given α ∈ [0, 1]N and iv ∈ IG, we define α ◦ iV as the NTU game given
by applying the Hurwicz criterion to each iv(S) with coefficients in α. Formally,
(α ◦ iV )(S) :=
{
(αj ◦ iaj)j∈S ∈ RS : ia ∈ iV (S)
}
− RS+ (3)
for all S ⊆ N , where iV is defined as in (1). As usual, −RS+ allows us to assure compre-
hensivity (despite the incompleteness of the partial order 4).
Proposition 3.1 Given α ∈ [0, 1]N and iv ∈ IG, the associated NTU game α ◦ iV is
equivalent to the TU game α ◦ iv defined as follows:
(α ◦ iv)(S) :=
(
max
j∈S
αj
)
◦ iv(S) ∈ R (4)
for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
Proof. Fix S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. If S = {j}, then
(α ◦ iV )(S) = (α ◦ iV )({j}) (3)(1)= {αj ◦ iaj : iaj 4 iv({j})} − R{j}+
= {αj ◦ iv({j})} − R{j}+ =
{
x ∈ R{j} : x ≤ αj ◦ iv({j})
}
≡ αj ◦ iv({j}) =
(
max
j∈S
αj
)
◦ iv(S).
Take S ⊆ N , |S| > 1, and k ∈ arg maxj∈S αj. In case of more than one possible k, we
take any one of them. Let T = S \ {k} 6= ∅. For each ia ∈ I, let |ia| := ia− ia. Then,
(α ◦ iV )(S)
(3)
=
{
(αj ◦ iaj)j∈S ∈ RS : ia ∈ iV (S)
}
− RS+
(1)
=
{
(αj ◦ iaj)j∈S ∈ RS :
∑
j∈S
iaj 4 iv(S)
}
− RS+
=
{
(αj ◦ iaj)j∈S ∈ RS :
∑
j∈S
iaj = iv(S)
}
− RS+
=
{
(xj + αjyj)j∈S∈RS :
∑
j∈S
xj = iv(S), x∈RS,
∑
j∈S
yj = |iv|(S), y ∈ RS+
}
−RS+.
Given that x ∈ RS is only restricted by ∑j∈S xj = iv(S), this amount iv(S) can be freely
transferable among the players, so that the Pareto frontier is reached when
∑
j∈S αjyj is
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maximum, given that y ∈ RN+ and
∑
j∈S yj = |iv|(S). Since αk ≥ αj for all j ∈ S, this
maximum is αk · |iv|(S), reached at least when yk = |iv|(S) and yj = 0 otherwise. Hence,
(α ◦ iV )(S) =
{
(xj)j∈T × (xk + αk · |iv|(S)) ∈ RS :
∑
j∈S
xj = iv(S)
}
− RS+
=
{
x ∈ RS :
∑
j∈S
xj = iv(S) + αk|iv|(S)
}
− RS+
≡ αk ◦ iv(S) =
(
max
j∈S
αj
)
◦ iv(S).
Under Proposition 3.1, any coalitional interval game iv ∈ IG turns into a unique TU
game α ◦ iv ∈ G by applying the Hurwicz criterion with coefficients in α.
Given α ∈ [0, 1]N and an interval game solution iσ : IB → IN , we define iσ ◦ α :
IB → RN as the function given by applying iσ to α ◦ iv for each iv ∈ IB, i.e.
(iσ ◦α)j(iv) := iσj(α ◦ iv) ∈ R (5)
for all iv ∈ IB and j ∈ N .
Notice that both (2) and (5) apply an interval solution and the Hurwicz criterion with
some coefficients. The difference between both approaches is the order in which they do
so.
It is then natural to require this order to be irrelevant, i.e. both α ◦ iσ and iσ ◦ α
should coincide. We call this property Hurwicz compatibility. Formally,
Definition 3.1 An interval game solution iσ : IB → IN is Hurwicz compatible in IB if
(iσ ◦α)(iv) = (α ◦ iσ)(iv) for all iv ∈ IB and all α ∈ [0, 1]N .
Proposition 3.2 For all α ∈ [0, 1]N and all iv ∈ IG,∑
j∈N
(α ◦ iσ)j(iv) ≤
∑
j∈N
(iσ ◦α)j(iv)
for all efficient solution iσ : IG → IN . Moreover, equality holds iff either
• αj = αk for all j, k ∈ N or
• |iv|(N) = 0.
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Proof. Under efficiency,∑
j∈N
(α ◦ iσ)j(iv) (2)=
∑
j∈N
αj ◦ iσj(iv) =
∑
j∈N
(
iσj(iv) + αj · |iσj(iv)|
)
= iv(N) +
∑
j∈N
αj|iσj(iv)|≤ iv(N)+
(
max
j∈N
αj
)∑
j∈N
|iσj(iv)|
= iv(N) +
(
max
j∈N
αj
)
|iv|(N) =
(
max
j∈N
αj
)
◦ iv(N)
(4)
= (α ◦ iv) (N) =
∑
j∈N
iσj(α ◦ iv) (5)=
∑
j∈N
(iσ ◦α)j(iv).
Equality holds iff ∑
j∈N
αj |iσj(iv)| =
(
max
j∈N
αj
)∑
j∈N
|iσj(iv)|
which is equivalent to either αj = αk for all j, k ∈ N or |iσj(iv)| = 0 for all j ∈ N . Since
|x| is always nonnegative, this second condition is equivalent to |iv|(N) = 0.
Corollary 3.1 No efficient solution in the set of (size monotonic) coalitional interval
games is Hurwicz compatible.
In view of Proposition 3.2, we can only find Hurwicz compatibility in efficient solutions
when we restrict ourselves to two possible situations:
1. All the Hurwicz coefficients coincide (equal degree of optimism).
2. There is no uncertainty when all players cooperate (grand coalition certainty).
4 Uniform degree of optimism
In this Section we study which interval solutions are Hurwicz compatible when all coef-
ficients coincide.
Definition 4.1 Given IB ⊆ IG, an interval game solution iσ : IB → IN is uniform
Hurwicz compatible in IB if, for all α0 ∈ [0, 1], we have (iσ ◦ α)(iv) = (α ◦ iσ)(iv) for
all iv ∈ IB, where αj = α0 for all j ∈ N .
Let us consider a coalitional interval game iv and α ∈ [0, 1]N the vector of players’
Hurwicz coefficients. We denote αS := maxj∈S αj and
nS :=
|S|!(n− 1− |S|)!
n!
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for each S ⊆ N . By convention, α∅ := 0.
We consider here the Shapley value of the TU game α ◦ iv, i.e.
Shj(α ◦ iv) :=
∑
S,j 6∈S
nS
(
αS∪{j} ◦ iv(S ∪ {j})− αS ◦ iv(S)
)
(6)
for each j ∈ N . On the class of size monotonic coalitional interval games, Alparslan Go¨k
et al. (2010) define a generalization of the Shapley value, which we call the interval
Alparslan Go¨k-Braˆnzei-Tijs (ABT) solution, as follows:
iABTj(iv) :=
∑
S,i6∈S
nS · (iv(S ∪ {i})	 iv(S))
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N . Analogously, Han et al. (2012) define another gen-
eralization of the Shapley value, which we call the interval Han-Sun-Xu (HSX) solution,
as follows:
iHSXj(iv) :=
∑
S,i6∈S
nS · (iv(S ∪ {i}) iv(S))
for each iv ∈ IG and each j ∈ N .
Proposition 4.1 The interval ABT solution is uniform Hurwicz compatible in SMIG.
Proof. The interval ABT solution can be written as
iABTj(iv) =
[∑
S,j 6∈S
nS (iv(S ∪ {j})− iv((S)) ,
∑
S,j 6∈S
nS
(
iv(S ∪ {j})− iv(S))]
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N . Since all the Hurwicz coefficients coincide (α1 =
α2 = · · · = αn = α0), then α ◦ iABT (iv) = Sh(α ◦ iv). In particular,
α ◦ iABTj(iv)
= (1− α0)
(∑
S,j 6∈S
nS (iv(S ∪ {j})− iv((S))
)
+ α0
(∑
S,j 6∈S
nS
(
iv(S ∪ {j})− iv(S)))
=
∑
S,j 6∈S
nS
(
(1− α0) (iv(S ∪ {j})− iv(S)) + α0
(
iv(S ∪ {i})− iv(S)))
=
∑
S,j 6∈S
nS
((
(1− α0)iv(S ∪ {j}) + α0iv(S ∪ {j})
)− ((1− α0)iv(S) + α0iv(S)))
=
∑
S,j 6∈S
nS (α0 ◦ iv(S ∪ {j})− α0 ◦ iv(S)) = Shj(α ◦ iv)
= iABTj(α ◦ iv) = (iABT ◦α)j (iv)
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N .
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Theorem 4.1 An efficient solution iσ : IG → RN is uniform Hurwicz compatible in
IG if and only if there exist two vectors δ ∈ RN and γ ∈ RN+ with
∑
j∈N δj = 0 and∑
j∈N γj = 1, and such that
iσj(iv) = δj · [1, 1] + γj · iv(N) (7)
for all iv ∈ IG and all j ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Assume iσ is defined as in (7). It is clear that such a solution is efficient.
We now check that it is uniform Hurwicz compatible. Fix iv ∈ IG. Let α0 ∈ [0, 1] and
let α ∈ [0, 1]N defined as αj = α0 for all j ∈ N . We have to prove that (iσ ◦ α)(iv) =
(α ◦ iσ)(iv). For each j ∈ N ,
(iσ ◦α)j(iv) = iσj(α ◦ iv)
= δj · [1, 1] + γj · (α ◦ iv(N))
≡ δj + γj · (α ◦ iv(N))
and
(α ◦ iσ)j(iv) = α ◦ iσj(iv)
= α ◦ (δj · [1, 1] + γj · iv(N))
= δj + γj · (α ◦ iv(N)).
(⇒) Let iσ : IG → IN be an efficient, Hurwicz compatible solution in IG. Let
iv ∈ IG. Let 1 ∈ [0, 1]N defined as 1j = 1 for all j ∈ N , and let 0 ∈ [0, 1]N defined as
0j = 0 for all j ∈ N . Then, for each iv ∈ IG,
iσj(iv) = 1 ◦ iσj(iv) = iσj(1 ◦ iv) = iσj(iv) (8)
and
iσj(iv) = 0 ◦ iσj(iv) = iσj(0 ◦ iv) = iσj (iv) . (9)
Since both iv and iv are TU games, we deduce that iσ only depends on its restriction
on TU games, i.e., once we define iσ(v) for each v ∈ G, we can deduce iσ(iv) for any
other iv ∈ IG. Moreover, given v, w ∈ G with v(S) ≤ w(S) for all S ⊆ N , it holds
iσ(v) ≤ iσ(w) (otherwise, iσ(iw) with iw(S) = [v(S), w(S)] for all S ⊆ N would not be
well-defined). Now, for each v ∈ G, define v−, v+ ∈ G as follows:
v+(S) :=
{
v(N) if v(S) ≤ v(N)
v(S) if v(S) > v(N)
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v−(S) :=
{
v(S) if v(S) ≤ v(N)
v(N) if v(S) > v(N)
for all S ⊆ N . Clearly, v−(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ v+(S) for all S ⊆ N . Hence, iσ(v−) ≤ iσ(v) ≤
iσ(v+). Moreover, v−(N) = v(N) = v+(N) and hence iσ(v−) = iσ(v) = iσ(v+). For
each x ∈ R, define ux ∈ G as follows:
ux(S) :=
{
x if S = N
0 if S 6= N
for all S ⊆ N . On one hand, either uv(N)(S) ≤ v+(S) for all S ⊆ N (when v(N) > 0) or
v−(S) ≤ uv(N)(S) for all S ⊆ N (when v(N) ≤ 0). On the other hand, uv(N)(N) =
v(N) = v+(N) = v−(N). Hence, either iσ(uv(N)) = iσ(v+) (when v(N) > 0) or
iσ(uv(N)) = iσ(v−) (when v(N) ≤ 0). In either case,
iσ(v) = iσ
(
uv(N)
)
(10)
i.e. the only relevant value is v(N). Let
f(x) := iσ(ux) (11)
for all x ∈ R. Now, we prove that
fj(α0 · x) = α0 · fj(x) + (1− α0) · fj(0) (12)
for all j ∈ N , all α0 ∈ [0, 1], and all x ∈ R. We assume x > 0. Case x < 0 is analogous
and case x = 0 is trivial. Define iu0x ∈ IG as follows:
iu0x(S) :=
{
[0, x] if S = N
0 if S 6= N
for all S ⊆ N . Let α ∈ [0, 1]N defined by αj = α0 for all j ∈ N for some α0 ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, for each j ∈ N ,
fj(α0 · x) = fj(α0 · x+ (1− α0) · 0) = iσj
(
uα0·x+(1−α0)·0
)
= (iσ)j
(
α ◦ iu0x) = (iσ ◦α)j (iu0x)
by uniform Hurwicz compatibility of iσ:
= (α ◦ iσ)j
(
iu0x
)
= α0 ◦ iσj
(
iu0x
)
= α0 ◦
[
iσj
(
iu0
)
, iσj (iu
x)
]
= α0 · iσj (iux) + (1− α0) · iσj
(
iu0
)
= α0 · fj(x) + (1− α0) · fj(0)
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α0 · fj(x) + (1− α0) · fj(0) fj(α0 · x)
Figure 1: Visual proof that (12) implies (13).
and hence (12) holds. This implies that there exist δj, γj ∈ R such that
fj(x) = δj + γj · x (13)
for all x ∈ R (see Figure 1).
Clearly, δj = fj(0). Moreover, γj ≥ 0 because otherwise iσj(iv) /∈ I when |iv|(N) > 0.
By efficiency of iσ: ∑
j∈N
δj =
∑
j∈N
fj(0) =
∑
j∈N
iσj(u
0) = u0(N) = 0
and ∑
j∈N
γj =
∑
j∈N
(γj · 1) =
∑
j∈N
(fj(1)− δj) =
∑
j∈N
iσj
(
u1
)−∑
j∈N
δj = u
1(N)− 0 = 1.
Finally, for all iv ∈ IG and all j ∈ N ,
iσj(iv)
(9)(8)
=
[
iσj (iv) , iσj
(
iv
)]
(10)
=
[
iσj
(
uiv(N)
)
, iσj
(
uiv(N)
)]
(11)
=
[
fj(iv(N)), fj
(
iv(N)
)]
(13)
=
[
δj + γj · iv(N), δj + γj · iv(N)
]
= δj · [1, 1] + γj ·
[
iv(N), iv(N)
]
= δj · [1, 1] + γj · iv(N).
In particular, when δj = δk and γj = γk for all j, k ∈ N , then δj = 0 and γj = 1n for
all j ∈ N , and so we obtain the interval egalitarian solution:
iEj(iv) :=
1
n
· iv(N)
for all j ∈ N .
An important implication of Theorem 4.1 is the following:
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Theorem 4.2 The interval egalitarian solution is the only efficient, symmetric, and uni-
form Hurwicz compatible solution in IG.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that the interval egalitarian solution
is the only symmetric one in the family of efficient, uniform Hurwicz compatible interval
solutions in IG.
Corollary 4.1 For n > 1, the interval HSX solution is not uniform Hurwicz compatible
in IG.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.2 and the fact that the interval HSX solution is efficient,
symmetric, defined in all IG, and (for n > 1) different from the interval egalitarian
solution in IG.
5 Grand coalition certainty
Let IC denote the set of interval coalitional games iv ∈ IG satisfying iv(N) = iv(N).
Clearly, G ⊂ IC.
A simple family of efficient solutions in IC is given by
iEωj (iv) = ωj(iv(N))
for all j ∈ N , where ω(x) ∈ RN satisfies ∑j∈N ωj(x) = x for all x ∈ R. In particular,
when ωj(x) = ωk(x) for all j, k ∈ N and all x ∈ R, we obtain the interval egalitarian
solution restricted to IC.
Theorem 5.1 An efficient solution iσ : IC → RN is Hurwicz compatible in IC if and
only if there exists a function ω that assigns to each x ∈ R a vector ω(x) ∈ RN with∑
j∈N ωj(x) = x and such that
iσ(iv) = iEω(iv)
for all iv ∈ IC.
Proof. Since we are in IC, iσ ◦ α = iσ for all efficient solution iσ and all α ∈ [0, 1]N .
Hence, Hurwicz compatibility is equivalent to
iσ(iv) = σ(α ◦ iv)
for all iv ∈ IC and all α ∈ [0, 1]N . It is not difficult to check that, given ω : R → RN
with
∑
j∈N ωj(x) = x for all x ∈ R, iEω is Hurwicz compatible in IC. Let iσ : IC → RN
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be an efficient Hurwicz compatible solution for IC. For each x ∈ R, let iex ∈ IC defined
as iex(N) = [x, x] and iex(S) = [0, 0] otherwise. Let
ωj(x) := iσj(ie
x)
for all x ∈ R and all j ∈ N . By efficiency of σ, we deduce ∑j∈N ωj(x) = x for all x ∈ R.
We prove that σ(iv) = iEω(iv) for all iv ∈ IC by induction on the cardinality of
Θ(iv) = {S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ : iv(S) 6= [0, 0]} .
Assume first |Θ(iv)| = 0. Then, iv = ieiv(N) and hence
iσ(iv) = iσ
(
ieiv(N)
)
= ω(iv(N)) = iEω(iv).
Assume now the result holds when the cardinality of Θ(iv) is less than θ > 0, and let
|Θ(iv)| = θ. Let S ∈ Θ(iv). We have three cases:
Case 1: 0 ∈ iv(S). Since S ∈ Θ(iv), we deduce that there exists some α0 ∈ [0, 1] such
that 0 = α0 ◦ iv(S). Let αj = α0 for all j ∈ N and let iv−S ∈ IC defined as follows:
iv−S(T ) :=
{
iv(T ) if T 6= S
[0, 0] if T = S
for all T ⊆ N . It is straightforward to check that α◦ iv = α◦ iv−S. Under Hurwicz
compatibility of iσ and the induction hypothesis,
iσ(iv) = σ(α ◦ iv) = iσ (α ◦ iv−S) = iσ (iv−S)
= iEω(iv
−S(N)) (iv−S) = iEω(iv(N)) (iv) .
Case 2: 0 < iv(S). Let αj = 1 for all j ∈ N . Let iv−0,S ∈ IC defined as follows:
iv−0,S(T ) :=
{
iv(T ) if T 6= S[
0, iv(S)
]
if T = S
for all T ⊆ N . It is straightforward to check that α◦iv = α◦iv−0,S. Under Hurwicz
compatibility of σ,
σ(iv) = σ(α ◦ iv) = σ (α ◦ iv−0,S) = σ (iv−0,S)
and we proceed as in Case 1 with iv−0,S.
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Case 3: iv(S) < 0. Let αj = 0 for all j ∈ N . Let iv+0,S ∈ IC defined as follows:
iv+0,S(T ) :=
{
iv(T ) if T 6= S
[iv(S), 0] if T = S
for all T ⊆ N . It is straightforward to check that α◦iv = α◦iv+0,S. Under Hurwicz
compatibility of σ,
σ(iv) = σ(α ◦ iv) = σ (α ◦ iv+0,S) = σ (iv+0,S)
and we proceed as in Case 1 with
(
iv+0,S
)
.
An important implication of Theorem 5.1 is the following:
Theorem 5.2 The interval egalitarian solution is the only efficient and symmetric Hur-
wicz compatible solution in IC.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 5.1 and the fact that the interval egalitarian solution is
the only symmetric one in the family of efficient, Hurwicz compatible interval solutions
in IC.
6 A comment on the core
Let us consider a cooperative interval game iv ∈ IG and α ∈ [0, 1]N . For any coalition
S ⊆ N , we denote αS = maxj∈S αj. The core of the TU game α ◦ iv ∈ G defined as in
(4) is the set:
C(α ◦ iv) :=
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
j∈N
xj = αN ◦ iv(N), αS ◦ iv(S) ≤
∑
j∈S
xj, ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
6.1 The interval core
The interval core with N players as defined in Alparslan Go¨k et al. (2009a) is the set
iC(iv) :=
{
ia ∈ IN :
∑
j∈N
iaj = iv(N), iv(S) 4
∑
j∈S
iaj,∀S ⊆ N
}
.
In this case, we can apply the Hurwicz criterion to iC(iv) and obtain the set
(α ◦ iC)(iv) = α ◦ iC(iv)
=
{
(α ◦ iaj)j∈N ∈ RN : ia ∈ iC(iv)
}
=
{(
iaj + αj|iaj|
)
j∈N ∈ RN :
∑
j∈N
iaj = iv(N), iv(S) 4
∑
j∈S
iaj,∀S ⊆ N
}
.
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It is clear that∑
j∈N
iaj = iv(N)⇐⇒
∑
j∈N
iaj = iv(N) and
∑
j∈N
|ia|j = |iv|(N)
and for any coalition S ⊆ N we have
iv(S) 4
∑
j∈S
iaj ⇐⇒ iv(S) ≤
∑
j∈S
iaj and |iv|(S) ≤
∑
j∈S
|ia|j.
Proposition 6.1 If all the Hurwicz coefficients coincide, α1 = α2 = · · · = αn = α0, then
α ◦ iC(iv) ⊆ C(α ◦ iv). (14)
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ α ◦ iC(iv). Then, xj = iaj + α0|iaj| for each j ∈ N and
some ia ∈ IN with ∑j∈N iaj = iv(N), ∑j∈N |ia|j = |iv|(N), iv(S) ≤ ∑j∈S iaj and
|iv|(S) ≤∑j∈S |ia|j for all S ⊆ N . Then,∑
j∈N
xj =
∑
j∈N
iaj + α0
∑
j∈N
|iaj| = α0 ◦ iv(N)
and, for any S ⊆ N ,
α0 ◦ iv(S) ≤
∑
j∈S
xj =
∑
j∈S
iaj + α0
∑
j∈S
|iaj|
so x ∈ C(α ◦ iv). Observe that inclusion (14) also holds when iC(iv) = ∅. Inclusion
C(α ◦ iv) ⊆ α ◦ iC(iv) is not always true, as in the following example.
Example 6.1 Consider n = 2 and the interval cooperative game iv given by iv({1}) =
iv({2}) = [1, 3] and iv({1, 2}) = [2, 4]. For this game, iC(iv) = ∅, while if we consider
α1 = α2 = 0, game α ◦ iv has non empty core: 0 ◦ iv({1}) = 1 ◦ iv({2}) = 1 and
0 ◦ iv({1, 2}) = 2, so C(α ◦ iv) = {(1, 1)}.
Then we can deduce the next result.
Proposition 6.2 The interval core is not uniform Hurwicz compatible in IG.
Remark 6.1 In we consider in the previous example certainty in the grand coalition, in
particular if we assume iv({1, 2}) = [2, 2], we have still that the inclusion C(α ◦ iv) ⊆
α ◦ iC(iv) does not hold.
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6.2 The interval square core
Given an interval cooperative game iv ∈ IG, we call border games the two (classical)
cooperative games defined as iv and iv where for any S ⊆ N , iv(S) = [iv(S), iv(S)]. In
Alparslan Go¨k et al. (2009c), the square interval core C (iv)C
(
iv
)
is defined as
C (iv)C
(
iv
)
:=
{
ia ∈ IN :
∑
j∈N
iaj = iv(N), ia ∈ C (iv) , ia ∈ C
(
iv
)}
and it has been proved that if iC(iv) 6= ∅ then C (iv)C (iv) = iC(iv). Then, the same
considerations of the interval core on the Hurwicz compatibility can be done.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study interval cooperative games. These are games where the worth of
coalitions are uncertain. Both a lower and an upper bound of the possible final outcome
is assigned to each coalition. For these games, several solution concepts provide interval
allocations to the players and leave uncertainty on the exit. In order to mitigate this
uncertainty, assuming some degree of optimism (or pessimism) of the players (given by
real numbers between 0 and 1), we introduce a TU cooperative game applying the Hurwicz
criterion. This procedure allows to have a standard solution concept once the degree of
optimism is fixed.
Another possibility for approaching the uncertainty is the following: consider any
interval solution concept in the original interval game and then apply the Hurwicz crite-
rion to the interval allocation. The question posed in the paper is if the two approaches
lead to the same result. The idea of Hurwicz compatibility is given and we investigate
under which conditions it holds. In the case of a uniform degree of optimism/pessimism
or of the grand coalition certainty, we prove that the only compatible solutions are the
proportional ones, or the egalitarian in case symmetry is required. Some considerations
on the Shapley value and the core solution are also discussed.
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